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ARTICLE
CHINA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CRACKDOWN
AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
by: Daniel C.K. Chow*
ABSTRACT
China’s highly publicized crackdown on corruption may affect the type and
number of cases in China that arise under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”), but it should not be assumed that the crackdown will necessarily
lead to fewer FCPA prosecutions. Although there is some overlap of the goals
of China’s corruption crackdown and the goals of the FCPA, China’s crack-
down also serves important goals of the ruling Communist Party. The main
goal of the current crackdown is to reinforce the Party’s power by targeting
enemies and rivals of the current leadership. The crackdown is not aimed at
prohibiting bribes given to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining busi-
ness; however, the FCPA is aimed at proscribing these types of bribes. As a
result, while the crackdown may deter some types of FCPA cases from arising
in China, other types of cases will be unaffected or may even increase.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In China’s most prosperous cities, high-end restaurants now sit ee-
rily quiet in the evenings; just several years ago they were bustling
with the boisterous sounds of lavish, liquor-fueled banquets attended
* Frank E. and H. Virginia Bazler Chair in Business Law, The Ohio State Uni-
versity Michael E. Moritz College of Law. The Author lived and worked in China as
in-house counsel at a multinational company’s China headquarters and dealt first
hand with many of the issues discussed in this Article. The Author thanks the partici-
pants at the Texas A&M FCPA Conference held on October 12, 2017 for their com-
ments and suggestions. Joshua McCarroll, a rising 2L at the Moritz College of Law,
provided valuable research assistance for this Article.
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by both government officials and their business associates.1 Luxurious
night clubs and karaoke bars, once packed with officials, have now
shuttered their doors.2 The high-end food and entertainment indus-
try—that used to generate thousands of dollars every evening3—is
now struggling to find alternative sources of revenue in response to
the government’s visible crackdown on government spending. These
are some of the most obvious signs of China’s crackdown on corrup-
tion. Other, more ominous signs are the highly publicized trials of cor-
rupt government and business officials receiving draconian criminal
penalties for crimes described in lurid detail of bribery, extortion, and
embezzlement.4 All over China, the effects of the Chinese govern-
ment’s crackdown on government corruption are visible.
Not only has the anti-corruption campaign shut down the more os-
tentatious consumption habits of government and Party officials, the
crackdown also appears to have a chilling effect on illegal conduct. In
every corner of China’s vast bureaucracy, officials are fearful and are
adopting a cautious attitude as officials openly talk about the risks of
professional and personal ruin that can result from accepting an illegal
bribe.5 One might assume that China’s nationwide campaign against
corruption, which has instilled fear in many of China’s bureaucrats,
might also lead to fewer cases under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act (“FCPA”)6 due to Chinese officials being on high alert and
therefore less willing to take the risk of accepting bribes. As discussed
below, some types of FCPA cases appear to be affected by the crack-
down, while other types of cases have not been affected; further, the
unaffected cases could increase in number as corrupt conduct migrates
from high-risk to low-risk areas. Although these may be areas of
lower risk in China’s current political climate, these are risks that
nonetheless fall squarely within the prohibitions of the FCPA, which is
jointly enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).7
This Article will discuss three areas in which the current crackdown
will likely not deter FCPA cases from arising. The first group of cases
1. See Mamta Badkar, China’s President Has Only Begun to Take Down the
Tigers and Swat the Flies in His Historic Corruption Crackdown, BUS. INSIDER (July
26, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-corruption-crackdown-
2014-7 [https://perma.cc/98GK-6UJQ].
2. See Edward Wong, Red Lights Dim in China’s Sin City, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/asia/red-lights-dim-in-chinas-sin-
city.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R2BM-LLQU].
3. See id.
4. See Andrew Jacobs, Chinese Trial Reveals Vast Web of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/world/asia/04crimewave.html
[https://perma.cc/B4FS-G3QM].
5. This observation is based upon the Author’s discussion with various lawyers
and officials in China, as well as the Author’s own personal observations in China.
6. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78ff (2012).
7. See id.
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concerns the conduct of persons considered to be private individuals
under People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) law, i.e. persons who are
not Party or government officials.8 Although these persons are not
considered to be Party or government officials, who are the focus of
China’s crackdown, some private persons might be considered to be
“foreign officials”9 within the meaning of the FCPA whose conduct
might trigger FCPA liability.10 In other words, while certain private
persons may not be the focus of China’s crackdown, the same persons
could be the target of FCPA actions. The second group of cases con-
cern the giving of a benefit in a form other than “money or prop-
erty”11 to a government or Party official.12 The salient provision of the
PRC Criminal Law that proscribes bribery of government or Party
officials prohibits the giving of “money or property” to such officials;
however, the statute does not mention benefits in other forms.13 By
contrast, the FCPA not only proscribes the giving of money or prop-
erty, but also the giving of “anything of value,” a much broader term
that reaches indirect and intangible benefits.14 Cases in which intangi-
ble benefits are given to Party or government officials, even those
which are not proscribed by PRC’s Criminal Law, might still fall
within the proscription of the FCPA.15 The third type of case involves
conduct that occurs outside of China where China’s state-owned en-
terprises (“SOEs”) are aggressively engaged in various investments
and business operations.16 Although China’s crackdown does not fo-
cus on activities occurring outside of China where SOEs can operate
with little oversight, the FCPA could capture the conduct of China’s
SOEs in foreign countries under some circumstances.17
II. CATCHING “TIGERS AND FLIES”
Although China’s current crackdown on corruption began with the
ascendancy of Xi Jinping to the office of the President of the PRC in
2012,18 China has suffered from persistent problems of corruption
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. The FCPA proscribes giving bribes to “foreign officials” for the purpose of
obtaining or retaining business. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1).
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. Article 385 of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) Criminal Law specifi-
cally refers to the giving of “money or property” as bribes. Many other provisions of
the PRC Criminal Law also refer explicitly to the illegal giving and receipt of “money
or property.” See, e.g., Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China [hereinafter
PRC Criminal Law], art. 385 (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997,
effective Oct. 1, 1997).
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 385.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
15. See id.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
18. See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China’s Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to
Less Transparency in the Enforcement of China’s Anti-Bribery Laws, 49 U.C. DAVIS
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since the early days of the current regime, founded in 1949.19 As early
as 1989, Party elders warned that corruption will ruin the Party.20
Since its founding, the PRC has periodically implemented anti-corrup-
tion campaigns,21 but the current crackdown appears to be unprece-
dented in both scope and severity. President Xi has warned that he
intends to catch both “tigers and flies,” that is, both high- and low-
level officials.22 In the past, corruption campaigns have been criticized
for using a few symbolic cases brought against minor officials to satisfy
public perception while allowing high-level officials to operate with
impunity.23 The most sensational recent case for PRC observers was
that of Zhou Yong Kang, the retired head of one of China’s most pow-
erful organs, the Ministry of Public Security, which oversees China’s
police and prisons.24 After a brief trial, Zhou was sentenced to life
imprisonment for graft.25 This case was significant because, in addition
to Zhou’s government post, he was also a member of China’s
Politburo.26 This group is the elite inner core of the Communist Party
consisting of about twenty or so cadres representing China’s highest
echelons of power.27 Until Zhou’s case, no one in China’s Politburo
had ever been found guilty in a corruption scandal and many assumed
that such persons were beyond the reach of the law for ordinary eco-
nomic crimes, such as graft and bribery, and subject only to crimes of
treason.28 Zhou’s case seems to indicate that under the current cam-
paign, no one is to be spared.29
L. REV. 685, 690 (2015) [hereinafter Chow, China’s Crackdown on Corruption]. Xi’s
real power stems from his position as General Secretary of the Communist Party, the
highest position in the Party, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission,
which controls the PRC military. Xi acquired these positions before he became Presi-
dent. His position as President of the PRC is a ceremonial position that has no real
power. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 103 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
CHINA].
19. See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEMS OF CHINA, supra note 18, at 54–55.
20. Chow, China’s Crackdown on Corruption, supra note 18, at 690.
21. Id. at 687.
22. Tania Branigan, Xi Jinping Vows to Fight ‘Tigers’ and ‘Flies’ in Anti-Corrup-
tion Drive, GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jan/22/xi-jinping-tigers-flies-corruption [https://perma.cc/U538-B2YL].
23. Chow, China’s Crackdown on Corruption, supra note 18, at 687.
24. Julie Makinen, Ex-Security Czar Gets Life Term as China Graft Trial Comes to
Quiet End, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/
la-fg-former-china-security-chief-sentenced-20150611-story.html [https://perma.cc/
BY9D-3G9G].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 18, at 128.
28. See Chow, China’s Crackdown on Corruption, supra note 18, at 696.
29. Zhou was retired and no longer a Politburo member when he was convicted.
So, the current campaign has not ensnared any current members of China’s highest
elite. This might be the last line that has not yet been crossed by the current
campaign.
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Xi’s campaign against official corruption serves at least two impor-
tant purposes. First, the Party has long been concerned about corrup-
tion because of the perception that corruption undermines its
legitimacy and its claim to power.30 The Communist Party frequently
trumpets its unique place in China’s history and its tortuous rise
against all odds to power.31 At various times in its history, the Party
was besieged and faced extinction.32 During the turbulent and chaotic
1920s and 1930s, the ruling Nationalist government ruthlessly hunted
members of the Party as “bandits” and killed them in the streets by
beheadings and shootings.33 The Party prevailed against the National-
ist government, a vastly superior enemy supplied with generals, mili-
tary weapons, and money from the United States34 that carried U.S.
hopes for a republican China that would serve as a counterweight in
Asia to the rise of the Soviet Union.35 In many ways, just as the Party
believes emperors of Imperial China ascended to the throne by celes-
tial authority through the “mandate of heaven,” the Party also be-
lieves that it ascended to leadership as a matter of destiny.36 These
sentiments are embodied in the preamble to the PRC Constitution,
which states that “twentieth century history has shown that only the
Communist Party can save the Chinese people and lead them to
happy lives.”37 This heroic portrayal of the Party is undermined by the
sordid tales of greed and debauchery by Party members. Corruption
demeans the Party in the eyes of the public, tarnishes its heroic stat-
ure, and undercuts its claim to legitimacy as the only capable leader of
the people.
The anti-corruption campaign may also serve a more personal goal
for President Xi. Critics claim that Xi is able to rid himself of enemies
by purging them through the guise of corruption charges.38 These crit-
ics argue that the true goal of the campaign is not to rid the Party of
corruption—instead, it is to rid the State of Xi’s enemies and rivals.39
According to this view, once these goals are accomplished, the fervor
30. See Daniel A. Bell, Why China’s Leaders See Corruption as a Mortal Threat,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-a-bell/
china-corruption-threat_b_6699410.html [https://perma.cc/JKK6-PM5M].
31. See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 18, at 120.
32. See id. at 121.
33. See id. at 122.
34. See id. at 121.
35. See id. at 13.
36. See id. at 121.
37. See id. at 120.
38. See Javier C. Herna´ndez, China Corruption Fight Extends to Top Officials in
Beijing and Shanghai, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
12/world/asia/china-crackdown-corruption-beijing-shanghai-ai-baojun-lu-xiwen.html?
mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/RS2Y-FFPE].
39. See id.
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of the anti-corruption campaign will begin to fade, and corruption
may once again be on the rise.40
III. EFFECT OF THE CRACKDOWN ON THE FCPA IN CHINA
China’s anti-corruption campaign may have an impact on the num-
ber of FCPA cases that arise in China, but not on every type of case
nor in every instance. To understand how FCPA cases will be affected,
we first examine China’s Criminal Law, which is the legal centerpiece
of the crackdown on government corruption. The anti-bribery provi-
sion of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC
Criminal Law”) is contained in Article 385, which states as follows:
“Any State functionary who, by taking advantage of his position, ex-
torts money or property from another person, or illegally accepts an-
other person’s money or property in return for securing benefits for
the person shall be guilty of acceptance of bribes.”41 In addition to
Article 385, other articles of the PRC Criminal Law also indicate a
focus on state functionaries and officials of state-owned enterprises.42
Article 385 focuses on “state functionaries” and bribery by state of-
ficials.43 A different provision of the PRC Anti-Unfair Competition
Law proscribes commercial bribery, i.e. bribes given or received by
private persons to business operators for the purpose of obtaining a
business advantage.44 Official corruption is a more serious offense
than commercial bribery, as it falls under the PRC Criminal Law,
which is viewed as fundamental law, while commercial bribery falls
under an economic law, which is considered secondary.45 The penal-
ties for official corruption are far more serious than penalties for com-
mercial bribery.46
40. See id.
41. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 385.
42. See, e.g., id. art. 382 (embezzlement by state functionaries); art. 384 (misappro-
priation of public funds by state functionaries); art. 388 (extortion by state functiona-
ries); art. 387 (acceptance of bribes by state organs and state owned enterprises); art.
396 (theft of state assets by state organs and state owned enterprises).
43. Id. art. 385.
44. See Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China [here-
inafter PRC Anti-Unfair Competition Law] (promulgated by Order No. 10 of the
President of the People’s Republic of China, Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art.
8.
45. Criminal Law is considered one of most important laws in the PRC; it is con-
sidered to be a “basic law” and was passed by the National People’s Congress, the
legislature in the PRC. A law such as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, passed by a
committee of the National People’s Congress, is viewed as “other laws” of less impor-
tance. For a hierarchy of laws and legal norms, see CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA,
supra note 18, at 159–60.
46. China’s commercial bribery penalty consists of a fine between 10,000 yuan and
200,000 yuan and confiscation of illegal earnings. In contrast, the criminal penalty for
official corruption can include administrative sanctions, confiscation of property, and/
or a prison term of one year to life imprisonment, depending on the amount embez-
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A. Government and Party Officials as Targets of the Crackdown
The term state functionary is not defined in the PRC Criminal Law,
but other provisions refer to a “functionary of a state organ”47 and a
“functionary of a relevant competent department of the State.”48
These terms indicate that a state functionary is a government official.
The term could also refer to a Communist Party official because the
Party sees itself as representing the State.49 Moreover, in the vast ma-
jority of cases, a government official is also a Party official.50 The
Party installs its members in all key government positions so the Party
can control the State.51 Most government officials and all high-ranking
government officials are also Party officials.52 The Party and the gov-
ernment are fused together at various points in the Party and govern-
ment hierarchy.53 The Party body and the government body have
exactly the same membership.54
The focus of Article 385 on Party and government officials is consis-
tent with the stated purposes of the crackdown on corruption. The
campaign is concerned primarily with official corruption by Party and
government officials and is not focused on private persons engaged in
commercial bribery.55 The crackdown is designed to protect the repu-
tation of the Party from criticism, embarrassment, and ridicule. The
campaign is not focused on cases of commercial bribery involving
non-members of the Party, especially small-scale corruption cases by
petty criminals.56 Commercial bribery is an economic crime that does
not directly threaten the Party’s reputation. While such persons are
outside of the scope of the anti-bribery provisions of the PRC Crimi-
nal Law and the crackdown on corruption, they may be within the
scope of persons covered under the FCPA.
The FCPA proscribes bribes paid to foreign officials to obtain or
retain business.57 The FCPA defines foreign officials to include an em-
zled and the seriousness of the circumstances. See PRC Anti-Unfair Competition
Law, supra note 44, Ch. 3, art. 22; PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 383.
47. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 238.
48. Id. art. 403.
49. See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEMS OF CHINA, supra note 18, at 120 (explaining that
the Communist Party views itself as the leader of the Chinese people).
50. See id. at 133.
51. See id.
52. For example, the Central Military Commission (“CMC”) controls the armed
forces of the PRC and is one of the most powerful and important entities in China.
The Central Military Commission of the Party and the Central Military Commission
of the PRC are two separate bodies, but the membership has been entirely the same
since 1982. Xi Jinping is the current chair of the CMC. See id. at 129.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Robber Barons, Beware, ECONOMIST (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.econo
mist.com/news/china/21676814-crackdown-corruption-has-spread-anxiety-among-chi
nas-business-elite-robber-barons-beware [https://perma.cc/RY3F-B2CN].
56. See id.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1).
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ployee of a foreign government or an instrumentality thereof and any
person acting in an official capacity on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment.58 An instrumentality of the PRC government includes SOEs,
which are companies that are owned in whole or in part by the State.59
State-controlled enterprises are also considered to be instrumentali-
ties of the State.60 The DOJ and SEC have indicated that it considers
employees of SOEs to be foreign officials.61 This expansive position
taken by the DOJ and SEC could mean that even low-level employees
of an SOE could be foreign officials for purposes of the FCPA.62
Under this definition, suppose that a sales agent of the China busi-
ness entity of a multi-national company (“MNC”) in the chemicals
industry approaches a purchasing agent, a low-level employee, of an
SOE about the potential sale of chemical materials. The purchasing
agent is indifferent about where to purchase the products. It makes
little or no difference to the purchasing agent if he purchases the
product from one seller as opposed to another; all of the sellers are
offering similar products at similar prices. In order to induce the
purchasing agent to buy the products, the sales agent offers to give the
purchasing agent a small kickback of several hundred to several thou-
sand dollars. The payment will go to the personal account of the
purchasing agent and will not be shared with anyone else in the SOE.
The sales agent will also receive a benefit from the completed sale.
The sales agent of the MNC receives credit for the sale and might then
also receive a year-end bonus or a promotion for good performance.
Both the purchasing agent and the sales agent can benefit personally
from the kickback. Such petty corruption occurs in China on a daily
basis and is tolerated by most people who are resigned to accept that
petty corruption is a regular part of doing business in China.63 This
type of petty corruption, involving a few hundred or thousand dollars,
is not the type of corruption involving Party or government officials
that is the focus of China’s anti-corruption campaign.64 The DOJ and
SEC could, however, view this transaction as a violation of the FCPA
if they consider it to be a payment of a bribe by the MNC’s China
business entity to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining busi-
ness. The low-level sales agent is an employee of a SOE and therefore
may be considered a foreign official by the DOJ and SEC. The sales
agent’s payment of the kickback was to a foreign official to obtain
business, i.e., the sale of the products by the MNC to the SOE. Cases
58. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1).
59. See Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 573, 581 (2012).
60. See id.
61. Id. at 582.
62. Id. at 583.
63. See JIE CHEN & BRUCE J. DICKSON, ALLIES OF THE STATE: CHINA’S PRIVATE
ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRATIC CHANGE 111 (2010).
64. See Barons, supra note 55.
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of petty corruption, while not the focus of the anti-corruption cam-
paign, may continue to trigger liability under the FCPA.
A special situation under current scrutiny in the PRC concerns
pharmaceutical companies providing kickbacks to doctors. Many doc-
tors in China work for state hospitals, which are responsible for deliv-
ering medical services to the majority of people in China.65 While
there are some private hospitals in China, the majority of people look
to low-cost state hospitals for their medical services.66 Doctors who
work in state hospitals are notoriously poorly compensated and work
under harsh conditions.67 It is common knowledge that doctors in
state hospitals can receive additional income in the form of kickbacks
from pharmaceutical companies.68 When a doctor prescribes a medi-
cation to a patient, the manufacturer of the medication makes a pay-
ment (i.e., a kickback) to the doctor.69 Everyone in China is aware of
this practice, but it is tolerated because doctors are so poorly compen-
sated. Without them, doctors may leave their jobs with state hospitals
either to work in private hospitals or to switch careers.70 Eliminating
the need for kickbacks by increasing compensation for doctors
through official channels is not an easy goal to achieve. In addition to
budget constraints, paying doctors on a scale similar to what doctors
are paid in other Asian countries runs into political opposition. In
China, doctors are viewed as servants of the people and it is not feasi-
ble in China’s current political climate for the State to give servants of
the people the type of high salaries that are paid to doctors in other
Asian countries.71 As a result, for decades PRC authorities have sim-
ply ignored the kickbacks that doctors receive from pharmaceutical
companies as a practical necessity to keep the system intact.72
China’s tolerant attitudes towards kickbacks were tested when a
massive $500 million kickback scheme involving Glaxo Smith Kline
65. Karen Eggleston et al., Comparing Public and Private Hospitals in China: Evi-
dence from Guangdong, BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 3–5 (2010), https://www.research-
gate.net/profile/Mingshan_Lu/publication/42440309_Comparing_Public_and_Private_
Hospitals_in_China_Evidence_from_Guangdong/links/0fcfd5123ce374dcd7000000/
Comparing-Public-and-Private-Hospitals-in-China-Evidence-from-Guangdong.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WZ7V-VBCQ].
66. See id.
67. Joe McDonald, Case Shines Light on China’s Medical Bribery, MORNING J.
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-morning-journal-lorain-oh/201308
02/281956015411326 [https://perma.cc/QTC3-2NUJ].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See Emily Rauhala, Why China’s Doctors Are Getting Beat Up, TIME (Mar. 7,
2014), http://time.com/15185/chinas-doctors-overworked-underpaid-attacked/ [https://
perma.cc/XYN5-DKVK].
72. See Physician, Heal Thyself: The Cost of Medicine, ECONOMIST (Feb. 1, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21595431-medicines-are-over-prescribed-and-
overpriced-physician-heal-thyself [https://perma.cc/G2G8-GAY4] [hereinafter The
Cost of Medicine].
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(“GSK”), a UK-based pharmaceutical company, was uncovered in
2014.73 Chinese authorities discovered that GSK was funneling nearly
half a million dollars in cash to doctors and state hospitals through
various third party entities, such as travel agencies, to induce them to
prescribe GSK’s pharmaceuticals.74 While PRC authorities had toler-
ated kickbacks to doctors for years, this was an organized scheme that
involved hundreds of millions of dollars and that, when exposed, em-
barrassed the PRC by the sheer size of the bribery scheme.75 As a
result, in 2017, the PRC passed legislation to eliminate kickbacks to
doctors.76 Over the past twenty years, similar legislation has been reg-
ularly enacted, but because of the prevailing tolerant attitudes of the
PRC authorities, the legislation prohibiting kickbacks has never been
enforced.77
The current situation involving medical kickbacks seems to create a
political dilemma for the Party, but this dilemma is quite different
from the prototypical case involving corruption by government offi-
cials. The kickbacks given to doctors are less about greed and avarice
and more about a practical and necessary solution to the problem of
low compensation for doctors. The State pays low salaries to doctors
based upon the fiction that as state workers in a socialist health care
system, doctors are willing to work for low salaries in order to serve
the people.78 As everybody in China knows, this is a self-serving fic-
tion of the Communist Party and does not accurately reflect the atti-
tudes of most doctors.79 Paying doctors more will involve higher state
expenditures and will expose the fiction of the altruistic and selfless
doctor, which are both undesirable outcomes for the Party. At pre-
sent, multinational pharmaceutical companies are providing subsidies
to doctors and hoping that maintaining the status quo will allow the
health care system to continue to function while the State finds a via-
ble solution to the problem of low compensation and difficult work
conditions. In other words, although the GSK case embarrassed the
Party, the Party still has an incentive to continue to tolerate kickbacks
73. Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly $500
Million in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
09/20/business/international/gsk-china-fines.html [https://perma.cc/PVR8-TQ5C].
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Notice of the National Health and Family Planning Commission on Print-
ing and Distributing the “Provisions on the Establishment of Bad Record of Commer-
cial Bribery in the Area of Medical Supplies and Pharmaceuticals Purchase and Sales”,
NAT’L HEALTH & FAM. PLAN. COMMISSION (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/
fzs/s3577/201312/ef92cb05dee341a18fff7b3e00eb1156.shtml [https://perma.cc/5SAS-
W5BE] (translated from Chinese). Circulars 49 and 163 issued by the National Health
and Planning Commission.
77. See The Cost of Medicine, supra note 72.
78. This observation is based on the Author’s own experience working as a lawyer
in China.
79. This observation is based on the Author’s own experience in China.
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to doctors, at least temporarily, while searching for a long-term solu-
tion to the problem of affordable health care.
While kickbacks to doctors create a political and social dilemma in
China, the DOJ and SEC might find that MNC pharmaceutical com-
panies are liable under the FCPA for making the kickbacks. State hos-
pitals are instrumentalities of the PRC government; doctors and
administrators who work for state hospitals therefore qualify as for-
eign officials under the FCPA.80 When a pharmaceutical company
gives a kickback to induce a doctor to prescribe its medications, the
kickback might qualify as a bribe given by a United States entity to a
foreign official to obtain business under the FCPA. As the GSK case
has exposed the schemes involved in these cases and the widespread
practice of kickbacks in the medical field, the DOJ and SEC have now
been alerted to the problem and may be on the lookout for such new
cases. FCPA investigations involving kickbacks given by MNC phar-
maceutical companies to doctors to induce them to prescribe the
MNC’s medications might increase in the near future. Cases concern-
ing doctors and pharmaceutical companies are examples of the types
of cases that might not be the subject of China’s crackdown on corrup-
tion, but that nonetheless may fall within the FCPA.
B. Money or Property Under PRC Law and “Anything of Value”
Under the FCPA
Article 385, the anti-bribery provision in the PRC Criminal Law,
prohibits the giving of “money or property” to state functionaries.81 A
separate provision creates a duty on the part of a state functionary to
identify the sources of his property. Article 395 states: “Where the
property or expenditure of any State functionary obviously exceeds
his legitimate income, and the difference is huge, he shall be ordered
to explain the sources. If he fails to do so, the difference shall be de-
termined as illegal income . . . .”82 This provision was enacted to deal
with the common problem of PRC officials who own expensive apart-
ments and drive luxury cars, even though they receive modest salaries.
The public views these officials with both cynicism and resignation.83
This provision is designed to deter Chinese state officials from flaunt-
ing their illegally acquired wealth by creating a duty for officials to
account for levels of wealth that appear to exceed their lawful sources
of income.84
80. See supra text accompanying notes 65–70.
81. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 385.
82. Id. art. 395.
83. This observation is based on the Author’s own experience. Many people in
China hold the cynical belief that all Party and government officials are corrupt—the
only question is one of degree.
84. Note that the provision creates an incentive to hide one’s wealth but does not
necessarily create an incentive to avoid accumulating illegal wealth in the first place.
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This provision and others85 show a focus on tangible financial assets
acquired and owned by state officials. In contrast, giving benefits to a
state functionary that are not tangible financial assets is outside the
scope of these laws and therefore not prohibited. The Party does not
seem to find intangible benefits to be a concern.
Under the FCPA, however, it is illegal to make a payment of
money, gift, or “anything of value.”86 The term “anything of value”
can encompass gifts of an intangible nature and is not limited to
money or property.87 Cases that involve intangible benefits might trig-
ger liability under the FCPA.88 For example, suppose that a U.S.-
based MNC finds that its intellectual property (“IP”) has been stolen.
The MNC sends representatives to PRC enforcement authorities to
lodge a complaint. The authorities inform the MNC that it must sub-
mit a report from a state-approved technology consulting company to
confirm that the alleged stolen information qualifies as a trade secret
under PRC law.89 The enforcement authority will refuse to act with-
out such a report because the authority does not want to act outside
the scope of its jurisdiction and does not want to bring an enforcement
action that has no merit.90 The PRC’s enforcement authority is in no
position to make an informed decision on whether to proceed.91 The
PRC authority’s expertise is in law enforcement, not in intellectual
property, and trade secrets can be highly complex and technical.92 As
a result, the enforcement authority demands that the MNC submit a
report from a qualified state technology consulting company that the
alleged stolen information qualifies as a trade secret.93 Sometimes, the
chief of the enforcement authority might direct the MNC to a state-
owned technology consulting company that is owned by or under the
supervision of a relative or friend.94 Once the MNC obtains the report
and files it, the authority can move forward with an enforcement ac-
tion and is protected if the defendant claims that the enforcement au-
thority acted improperly.
In China today, there are many state-owned or approved technol-
ogy-consulting companies all vying for business in the highly competi-
tive IP-enforcement field. If the MNC hires the company
recommended by the chief of the enforcement bureau, the DOJ and
SEC might view the hiring as providing an intangible benefit to the
85. See PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 385.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (5th Cir. 1996).
88. See id. at 1192–93.
89. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets Protection in
China, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1007, 1032 (2014).
90. See id. at 1031.
91. See id. at 1032.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 1035.
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enforcement bureau in exchange for the bureau agreeing to bring an
enforcement action. Article 385 of the PRC Criminal Law proscribes
the giving of money or property to the state official, but in this scena-
rio the MNC never gives the official any payments.95 The MNC will
pay fees to the consulting company owned or managed by the relative,
and the relative does not give any part of the payment to the state
official. The state official benefits by having helped a family member,
which violates no PRC law. In contrast, the DOJ and SEC might see
this intangible benefit as something of value which was given to a state
official for the purpose of obtaining the enforcement action that will
help the MNC retain business. This view could trigger an FCPA
investigation.
Many people in China today would find that the chief of the en-
forcement bureau did nothing ethically or legally wrong in recom-
mending a company owned by a relative to the MNC. Many people
would believe that it is natural and understandable for the chief to
want to help a relative, especially when he received no money or
property in return. The Criminal Law itself clearly states that an ille-
gal bribe occurs only when money or property is given to an official,96
leaving the door open for officials to derive intangible benefits in ex-
change for the exercise of power. Officials in the PRC may also see
nothing wrong with asking a MNC to provide an internship for a child
or relative.97 Although this situation is lawful under PRC law, provid-
ing the internship might be unlawful under the FCPA if the MNC re-
ceives business in return.98
C. State-Owned Enterprises and Corrupt Activities Abroad
The focus of Xi’s crackdown is on official corruption occurring in
China that exposes the Party to embarrassment, contempt, and ridi-
cule. Corrupt activities by PRC officials that occur in a foreign coun-
try are less visible and of less concern to China’s population and to the
Party. For this reason, state-owned enterprises might feel emboldened
to act corruptly in pursuing business opportunities abroad as they do
not fear prosecution for corruption in the PRC.
China is in the midst of an ambitious expansion of its business oper-
ations abroad, especially in developing countries,99 such as those in
Africa, where corruption was rampant long before China started do-
95. See PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 385.
96. See sources cited supra note 42.
97. See Antoine Gara, JPMorgan Agrees to Pay $264 Million Fine for ‘Sons and
Daughters’ Hiring Program in China, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2016, 4:44 PM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2016/11/17/jpmorgan-agrees-to-pay-264-million-fine-
for-sons-and-daughters-hiring-program-in-china/#62d410e65688 [https://perma.cc/
FRS4-HTPA].
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss & Keith Bradsher, China’s Global Ambitions, Cash
and Strings Attached, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/
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ing business there.100 For the last two decades, China and Africa have
been forging closer business ties. For example, in 2000, China and Af-
rica formed the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, a vehicle for
business cooperation between China’s state-owned enterprises and
governments in Africa.101 In November 2006, China announced that it
was creating a China-Africa development fund worth $5 billion to
support Chinese investment in Africa.102 During the Beijing Summit
of 2006, China also announced the creation of an aid package to Af-
rica consisting of grants and interest-free loans.103 A few months after
the Beijing Summit, the African Development Bank held its annual
board meeting in Shanghai.104 These developments indicate a mutual
interest in deepening China-Africa investment ties. However, there
are also reports of rampant business corruption by Chinese state-
owned enterprises in Africa.105
Unlike the United States, China does not impose any meaningful
constraints on the behavior of its companies in how they conduct busi-
ness in foreign countries.106 In fact, China’s only law dealing with the
conduct of its companies in foreign countries is Article 164 of the PRC
Criminal Law, which provides: “Whoever, for the purpose of seeking
illegitimate benefits, gives money or property to any employee . . .
shall be sentenced . . . .”107 This law may not serve as much of a deter-
rent to bribery by SOEs in foreign countries. Although Chinese SOEs
now have business operations in many countries abroad, Chinese au-
thorities have not brought a single prosecution since Article 164 be-
26/business/international/chinas-global-ambitions-with-loans-and-strings-attached
.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/Z7GZ-6TEK].
100. The Scale of Corruption in Africa, ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www
.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21679473-gloomy-news-transparency-in
ternational-scale-corruption-africa [https://perma.cc/2NLC-K8XD].
101. See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC (July 18, 2012), http://www
.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/t952503.htm [https://perma.cc/TWY8-U8ND].
102. Lovemore Chikova, Africa: Exploring the China-Africa Development Fund,
FOCAC (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t1405739.htm [https://perma
.cc/FC36-ZDHG].
103. Kenneth King, The Beijing China-Africa Summit of 2006: The New Pledges of
Aid to Education in Africa, 43 CHINA REP. 337 (2007), http://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/pdf/10.1177/000944550704300305 [https://perma.cc/NWC7-9HMN].
104. See Implementation of Follow-Up Actions of the Beijing Summit of Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/
t372569.htm [https://perma.cc/XCZ7-8MDU].
105. See Jeffrey Young, Corruption Concerns Taint Burgeoning China-Africa
Trade, VOA (Sept. 1, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/corruption-con-
cerns-tain-buregeoning-china-africa-trade/2432469.html [https://perma.cc/3QJC-
VY3C] (“China aggressively pursues and locks in economic opportunities using, ac-
cording to analysts, suitcases full of cash when it is needed to close the deal. Another
tactic used by Beijing is the ‘gift’ of building and donating public works projects to
African states that have raw materials and other things that China wants access to.”).
106. Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote its View of
Human Rights, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 681, 712 (2013).
107. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 11, art. 164. China enacted Article 164 in satis-
faction of its obligations under the UN Convention on anti-bribery.
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came law in 2011.108 The reasons why there have been no prosecutions
could be due to a lack of knowledge and evidence of unlawful pay-
ments. SOEs are operating in developing countries in Africa and Asia
and may be making clandestine payments. The PRC has no enforce-
ment authority in these foreign jurisdictions and local authorities may
not have an interest in pursuing these cases. Under these circum-
stances, PRC authorities might be unable to discover these cases in
order to bring a prosecution—even if these prosecutions were a high
priority. The foreign location of these cases, the evidentiary problems,
and an inability of enforcement in the PRC are all factors indicating
that foreign bribery might escape prosecution in the PRC under the
Criminal Law.
While PRC law may not deter Chinese entities from engaging in
corrupt activities abroad, such activities may fall within the scope of
the FCPA. Corruption could also give rise to new FCPA cases in coun-
tries where Chinese SOEs are aggressively pursuing business opportu-
nities. This can arise in one of two scenarios. First, Chinese SOEs that
have securities listed on a public stock exchange in the United States
fall within the jurisdiction of Section 78l of the FCPA that applies to
issuers.109 Chinese SOEs are increasingly seeking to raise capital in
the United States by registering their securities that are then sold on
U.S. stock exchanges.110 Suppose that an issuer SOE has operations in
a developing country and makes a bribe in that country that violates
the FCPA. Section 78dd-1 of the United States Code subjects all issu-
ers to its anti-bribery provisions.111 Section 78dd-1 provides that an
issuer or any “officer, director, employee[,] or agent of such issuer”
that makes a bribe to a foreign official to obtain business violates the
FCPA.112
Numerous accounts in the field indicate that Chinese SOEs are no-
torious for giving bribes in foreign nations as part of doing business.113
In May 2017, the SEC issued a subpoena to Sinovac Biotech Ltd., a
108. Daniel C.K. Chow, Rising Nationalism: China’s Regulation of Investment
Trade, CHINA’S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND INFLU-
ENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 67, 84 (Jacques deLisle & Avery Goldstein eds., 2017).
109. See Daniel Margolis & James Wheaton, Non-U.S. Companies May Also Be
Subject to the FCPA, 1 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 168, 170 (2009), https://www.pillsburylaw
.com/images/content/2/7/v2/2784/961FAE6040BDB25EB4E6C63B250A3AAE.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WB5L-KGPA]. The term “issuer” refers to an entity that “has a
class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title and every issuer which
is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of this title.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(b)(2).
110. See Might Sinovac Become the First Chinese Issuer to Resolve an FCPA En-
forcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 17, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/
might-sinovac-become-first-chinese-issuer-resolve-fcpa-enforcement-action/ [https://
perma.cc/A6B6-E56Z].
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd-1(a).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Andrew Higgins, Chinese Company Ensnared in Kickback Scandal in
Philippines, WASH. POST (June 24, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
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Beijing-based company with shares traded on NASDAQ, for docu-
ments related to an alleged bribe made by Sinovac to obtain drug ap-
provals in China from the China Food and Drug Administration.114
The subpoenaing of these documents could be the first step in an
FCPA investigation.115 In August 2017, both the SEC and the DOJ
opened an FCPA investigation into whether China Petroleum &
Chemical Corporation, one of China’s largest SOEs and a registered
issuer of U.S. securities that trades on the New York Stock Exchange,
paid Nigerian officials over $100 million to resolve a business
dispute.116
A second scenario involves cases in which the FCPA applies to for-
eign persons. Section 78dd-3 of the FCPA states:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . or for any officer, director,
employee, or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting
on behalf of such person, while in the territory of the United States,
corruptly to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce . . . in furtherance of [a bribe to . . . any
foreign official . . . in order to assist such person in obtaining or
retaining business . . . .117
The reference to “any person” includes a foreign person.118 This pro-
vision of the FCPA was designed to subject foreign persons to the
jurisdiction of the FCPA as long as such persons have a nexus to the
United States.119 The statute recognizes that such a nexus exists when
the foreign person is physically present in the United States,120 even if
only on a temporary basis. Chinese SOEs that are not issuers under
Section 78dd-1, but that do have a physical presence in the United
States and make an illegal payment in a foreign nation, are subject to
liability under the FCPA.121 For example, suppose that a Chinese SOE
has an office or branch in the United States and also a branch in a
developing country. This is not a remote scenario, as many SOEs are
large corporate conglomerates with many branches and related affili-
ate entities that have a presence in many countries.122 The SOE’s
asia_pacific/chinese-company-ensnared-in-kickback-scandal-in-philippines/2012/06/
24/gJQAjdYizV_story.html?utm_term=.0924d1b57855 [https://perma.cc/CY64-4S5H].
114. See Might Sinovac Become the First Chinese Issuer to Resolve an FCPA En-
forcement Action?, supra note 110.
115. See id.
116. US Probes Chinese Oil Firm over ‘$100m Bribe Paid to Nigerians’, VANGUARD
(Aug. 31, 2017, 11:07 PM), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/08/us-probes-chinese-
oil-firm-100m-bribe-paid-nigerians/ [https://perma.cc/A6Z5-KKRN].
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
118. See Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647,
657–58 (2010).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
120. See id. (unlawful for any person “while in the territory of the United States” to
make an illegal payment).
121. See id.
122. See Liyan Chen, 2015 Global 2000: The Largest Companies in China, FORBES
(May 6, 2015, 9:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/05/06/2015-
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branch office in the foreign nation pays a bribe to a foreign official in
return for obtaining business. The presence of the SOE’s other branch
office in the United States could subject the SOE to FCPA liability for
the payment in the developing country. This scenario could also trig-
ger liability under Section 78dd-3 of the United States Code.
Given the aggressive pursuit of business opportunities by SOEs in
developing countries and their ability to operate largely outside the
purview of the current anti-corruption campaign, SOEs may continue
to engage in corrupt activities abroad. Although these cases may not
result in prosecution in the PRC, a case involving Chinese SOEs
might trigger liability under the FCPA. Cases involving Chinese SOEs
that make illegal bribes might also ensnare U.S. persons or firms. For
example, U.S. nationals working for a branch office of the SOE in the
United States or for third parties such as accounting or law firms hired
by the SOE might also be subject to an FCPA investigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
China’s anti-corruption campaign has drawn worldwide media at-
tention. This Article is a study of the effect of the campaign on deter-
ring FCPA cases in China from arising in the future. One might
assume that the Chinese government’s campaign against corruption
would also deter cases from arising under the FCPA, but the situation
is more complex. While the purposes and scope of the current cam-
paign overlap in part with those of the FCPA, the current campaign
also promotes other important political goals for China’s current
leader, Xi Jinping. These goals are to protect the Communist Party
from embarrassment and to reinforce its power.
China’s current campaign focuses on the payment of money or
property to Party and government officials. The crackdown seems to
be instilling fear and concern among Party and government officials—
especially in rivals of the current leader, Xi Jinping. This development
suggests that FCPA cases based on bribes given in the form of money
or property to Party or government officials may decrease in the near
future. Party and government officials may avoid accepting large gifts
of money or property for fear of prosecution by Chinese authorities.
However, China does not have much interest on petty corruption
cases involving private persons. These cases do not appear to threaten
the Party’s reputation and most people in China accept petty corrup-
tion as a reality of doing business. There is a special political and so-
cial problem involving doctors working at state hospitals. China has
long-tolerated kickbacks given to these doctors by pharmaceutical
companies, but the recent GSK case embarrassed the Party by the
sheer size and audacity of the kickback scheme, which totaled $500
global-2000-the-largest-companies-in-china/#44ffd05a1fbd [https://perma.cc/XB9V-
6XGC].
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million in bribes. Although the scheme embarrassed the Party, they
still have an incentive to tolerate the kickbacks because they supple-
ment the meager compensation that state doctors receive. While
China’s current anti-corruption campaign might still tolerate these
types of kickbacks, the DOJ and SEC may bring FCPA actions against
the MNC pharmaceutical companies because the kickbacks given by
MNCs to doctors fall within the definition of bribes given to foreign
officials to obtain business.
China’s crackdown is focused on gifts of money or property, not
intangible benefits. The relevant PRC laws are explicit that gifts of
intangible benefits to Party and government officials are not illegal.
These laws may reflect China’s cultural belief that there is nothing
ethically or morally wrong with receiving an intangible benefit in ex-
change for a favor by a Party official. Thus, a Party official might ask
an MNC to hire a company owned or managed by a relative. No direct
money or property is given to the Party official, only the intangible
benefit of having helped a relative or friend. However, the FCPA’s
proscription captures not only gifts of money or property, but also
“anything of value,” a term that is broad enough to encompass gifts of
intangible benefits. While China’s crackdown may not deter gifts of
intangible benefits, these cases may trigger liability under the FCPA.
China’s campaign is focused on what occurs within China because
that is the activity that directly threatens the Party. China’s current
campaign does not seem concerned with the activities of China’s many
powerful SOE’s business dealings in other countries. China is in the
midst of an aggressive expansion of its business activities conducted
by SOEs in parts of the developing world that are already known for
corruption and lax enforcement of laws against bribery. The current
crackdown is not likely to deter SOEs from aggressive business tactics
that involve giving bribes to foreign governments for the purpose of
obtaining business or resolving business problems. China’s leaders
seem to have scant interest in cracking down on these types of cases.
But, many of these cases fall squarely within the FCPA. While China’s
SOEs may not be subject to prosecution in China, they could be ex-
posed to liability under the FCPA. SOEs that have a nexus to the
United States, such as by listing securities on a U.S. stock exchange or
by having an office in the United States, become subject to the
FCPA’s jurisdiction. As China’s SOEs continue to expand aggressively
overseas, FCPA cases involving China’s SOEs may increase in num-
ber. U.S. nationals or U.S. businesses such as law firms and accounting
firms that work for Chinese SOEs in the United States may become
ensnared in FCPA investigations.
This study suggests that the relationship between China’s crack-
down on corruption within its ranks and the FCPA is not straightfor-
ward but complex. While China’s anti-corruption campaign may have
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the side effect of deterring some types of FCPA cases in China, other
cases may not be affected, and still some cases may in fact increase in
number.
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